Foreword by Coseru, Christian
 Many worry that our growing understanding of the brain mechanisms that regu-
late behavior threatens our deeply entrenched conception of freedom and our abil-
ity to hold individuals responsible for their actions. If popular science accounts 
are to be believed, scientists have already demonstrated that there is no such thing 
as ‘free will’ or that, at best, free will is a conscious illusion. That science, and 
neuroscience in particular, has demonstrated no such thing as the absence of free-
dom in a causally governed universe should be obvious to anyone acquainted 
with the scientific literature on consciousness and behavior. But suspicions persist 
and unease about the inevitable demise of a much-cherished conception of what 
we are (and are capable of ) – not merely as biological and social entities, but as 
persons endowed with such distinctive capacities as pondering, deliberating, and 
acting for a reason – has taken the place of sober reflection, at least for most lay 
people. 
 But even among the philosophically savvy, the question of whether freedom 
is incompatible with determinism frames much of the contemporary conversa-
tion. Those who look to science for answers may reason that it is just a matter of 
time before science settles the question of free will once and for all (and settles 
it against deeply entrenched beliefs about libertarian freedom). Even hard-nosed 
incompatibilists, who think freedom is incompatible with determinism, are weary 
that concepts such as intention, deliberation, decision, and the weighing of rea-
sons, may not suffice to allay general anxieties about the possible (and not merely 
presumed) explanatory reducibility of the mental states these concepts represent. 
Whether indeterminism is less threatening to free will than determinism is an 
open question. Indeed, in a universe of purely random events, the idea that we 
could be the agents of uncaused actions is even more superfluous than taking 
agency to be a psychological fiction, albeit a useful one. 
 Western views of the relationship between free will and determinism began to 
take shape at the dawn of the modern era, marked in part by a revival of inter-
est in classical moral theories and their preoccupation with virtue and human 
flourishing. They also have their roots in a critique of the rigid and presumably 
infallible principles of Judeo-Christian morality advanced by the French moral-
ists (e.g., Montaigne, Pascal, and La Rochefoucauld) and the British sentimen-
talists (e.g., Hume, Smith, Shaftesbury). As pre-modern conceptions of humans 
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occupying a fixed place in the natural and social order give way to new forms of 
personal identity, the problem of free will takes center stage. It is this free-willing 
human, with all her foibles, dispositions, and candid aspirations of freedom, that 
becomes the harbinger of Enlightenment-era conceptions of rationality and of all 
subsequent Western disputes about whether morality is (or should be) grounded 
in the laws of nature or in the laws of reason. 
 Indeed, a great deal of modern Western thought is concerned with individual 
autonomy and the unlocking of human potential in a world that is no longer gov-
erned by inscrutable divine laws. While the existence of free will is not always 
implicitly assumed, the main concern seems to be with how best to express it. 
Those who question the possibility of free will in a deterministic universe need 
look no further than to the great social upheavals of our modern era, from the 
abolition of monarchy and the divine rights of kings to the end of slavery and 
the women’s liberation movement. Critics, arguing from a naturalist standpoint, 
object that what is here invoked as an expression of free will is but the messy 
unraveling of the evolutionary drama of the human animal, constrained by its phy-
logeny and bound by environmental factors to a course of action that is ultimately 
reducible to natural causes: climate change, fertility rates, disease, the scarcity or 
abundance of resources, genetic mutations, and other impersonal factors. Are free 
will and determinism compatible? Is there a way of reconciling our first-personal 
account of volitional action with third-person perspectives of their underlying 
physical and biological processes? Is there another, perhaps more enlightened, 
way of conceiving of humans, or, indeed, of being human, that demands a radi-
cal reassessment of our understanding of voluntary action and of the causal and 
motivational factors that inform, condition, and sanction our value judgments? 
 Buddhism is unique among the world’s great philosophical traditions in articu-
lating a conception of action that, it seems, dispenses altogether with the notion of 
agent-causation. While Buddhists pursue what are unmistakably moral ends, there 
is no stable self or agent who bears the accumulated responsibility for initiating 
those pursuits, and seemingly no normative framework against which some dis-
positions, thoughts, and actions are deemed auspicious and thus worthy of culti-
vation, while others are not so deemed. It is not surprising, therefore, to find a near 
universal lack of agreement among contemporary interpreters about whether Bud-
dhist metaphysics, with its reductionist, no-self view, has any room for a notion 
of free will. And yet, to millions of contemplative practitioners worldwide, Bud-
dhist metaphysics provides as accurate a descriptive account of the immediacy of 
lived experience as is possible outside the confines of modern experimental psy-
chology. The explosion of the mindfulness phenomenon, backed in large measure 
by empirical studies purporting to demonstrate that you can ‘train’ your brain to 
achieve ever greater degrees of freedom and autonomy, appears to lend credibility 
to Buddhism’s millennia-old claim that disciplined cultivation can reverse deeply 
entrenched forms of psychological conditioning. 
 In the most comprehensive study to date of Buddhism and free will, Rick 
Repetti, a philosopher by training and long-time contemplative practitioner, makes 
a compelling case that in laying out his eightfold path program, the Buddha aimed 
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to produce ‘meditation virtuosos’ – individuals exhibiting extraordinary feats of 
mind-control far in excess of what champions of free will think the capacity to ‘do 
otherwise’ entails. Charting a new theoretical path between the extremes of hard 
incompatibilism, determinism, and indeterminism, Repetti articulates a highly 
original version of compatibilism that, while rooted in the Buddhist tradition, draws 
on the wealth of empirical evidence from the neuroscience of meditation. Read-
ers looking for a clear and comprehensive introduction to the free will debate, 
and researchers curious to find out what the empirical literature on mindfulness 
practice can contribute to conceptions of agency and responsibility, will find  Bud-
dhism, Meditation, and Free Will: A Theory of Mental Freedom extraordinarily 
useful. By exploring the neural basis of enlightened moral agency, Repetti offers a 
sustained, nuanced, and in-depth defense of the view that the correlations between 
subpersonal processes (specifically those that regulate affective, retributive, and 
cognitive behavior) and first-person accounts (of the cultivation of compassion, 
forbearance, or equanimity) should be understood, contrary to popular belief, as 
extending rather than limiting the scope of human freedom. 
 Christian Coseru 
 Charleston, SC 
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